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1. Introduction 
1.1. Commissioner’s statements 
The New Zealand Commissioner of Inland Revenue issues 
several kinds of statements that are in effect legal opinions. 
This article relates to certain public statements formerly 
known as “policy statements” and now called “interpretation 
guidelines”. The change of name occurred in 1995, when the 
department was reorganised and two new divisions were 
formed: Policy Advice and Adjudications and Rulings. 
“Policy statements” became the responsibility of 
Adjudications and Rulings. The new name of “interpretation 
guidelines” was chosen to avoid misleading people into 
thinking that such statements emanate from the Policy Advice 
Division.  
As a preliminary matter, it is helpful to distinguish 
interpretation guidelines from other forms of opinions or 
statements that the Commissioner issues. There are two 
primary groups of such statements: binding rulings and 
standard practice statements. 
1.2. Binding rulings, determinations, and standard 
practice statements 
Binding rulings, issued under Part VA of the New Zealand 
Tax Administration Act 1994, are the most formal of the 
Commissioner’s statements. Binding rulings are of three 
types: public rulings, product rulings, and private rulings. The 
first two are published but private rulings remain confidential 
to the taxpayers that apply for them. The Commissioner issues 
public rulings essentially on his own initiative, in order to 
clarify some area of law of general interest. Taxpayers apply 
for product rulings in order to obtain certainty as to the tax 
consequences of investments that are to be marketed to the 
public. Private rulings relate to transactions proposed by 
individual taxpayers. From taxpayers’ point of view, the merit 
of binding rulings is that they can rely on them for the 
duration specified in the ruling even if the Commissioner 
changes his mind or a later case shows him to have been 
wrong. 
Akin to rulings are “determinations”,2 which are issued in 
somewhat similar circumstances but which relate to two 
specific areas of the Income Tax Act only: the calculation of 
income and expenditure in respect of loans and other financial 
arrangements and to certain matters in respect of petroleum 
mining. They are separate from rulings largely for historical 
reasons, in that Parliament first provided for determinations in 
                                                  
2 Tax Administration Act 1994 Part V. 
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limited areas where they were particularly necessary, before 
later enacting legislation for a general rulings process. 
Standard practice statements differ from binding rulings 
and determinations in several respects. First, the 
Commissioner issues them pursuant to his inherent 
administrative powers as Commissioner, rather than pursuant 
to specific statutory authority. Secondly, they are not binding 
on the Commissioner, though the Commissioner and the 
Inland Revenue Department endeavour to abide by them. 
Thirdly, standard practice statements are produced by Inland 
Revenue’s Operations Division. Standard practice statements 
concern the department’s administrative practices or set out 
policy that is to be applied in the exercise of discretions that 
the Income Tax Act vests in the Commissioner. 
The functions of the Operations Division are as its name 
suggests. It includes most of Inland Revenue’s personnel. 
Inland Revenue’s other two main divisions, Policy Advice 
and Adjudications and Rulings, were mentioned earlier. They 
are much smaller and more specialised. Binding rulings are 
one of the responsibilities of the Adjudications and Rulings 
division. The other is to perform in-house quasi-judicial 
assessments of disputes between the Commissioner and 
taxpayers. This process often results in the settlement of 
disputes; if not, one objective is to narrow the area of focus 
before taxpayer objections go to court. 
1.3. Reason for policy statements and interpretation 
guidelines 
Interpretation guidelines and their forerunners, policy 
statements, in a sense fall between binding rulings and 
standard practice statements. Like standard practice 
statements they are not binding and are issued under the 
Commissioner’s inherent powers. On the other hand, like 
binding rulings they are the responsibility of the 
Adjudications and Rulings Division. A further similarity to 
rulings is that they deal with difficult points of law, and often 
read rather like legal opinions.   
The Commissioner issues interpretation guidelines when it 
appears to be desirable to offer an element of certainty, or, at 
least, to minimise uncertainty, in respect of a general area of 
law. Although they are not legally binding on the 
Commissioner he generally follows them administratively. 
One advantage of a guideline over a public ruling is that in 
circumstances where the Commissioner does not wish to 
make a statement as a public ruling that is certainly to be 
binding come what may, a guideline is able to serve. 
Nevertheless, one should not make too much of this factor. 
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The Commissioner expects to follow interpretation 
guidelines, and does not issue them with one eye on the 
possibility of having to act contrarily to them. 
A second reason for issuing an interpretation guideline 
rather than a public ruling is that public rulings can apply only 
to an “arrangement”3 that is “specified in the ruling”.4 This 
limitation restricts the subject matter of possible public 
rulings. It is true that “arrangement” is widely defined, and 
that “specified”, presumably, must relate not to a single 
specific arrangement but to any arrangement of a specific 
kind; nevertheless, the Commissioner’s powers to issue public 
rulings must clearly be employed in relation to arrangements 
that are defined with some specificity. It follows that public 
rulings are not suitable vehicles to convey the 
Commissioner’s views on general matters such as what sort of 
arrangements amount to tax avoidance or how taxpayers 
should address questions of form and substance. 
1.4. Process for developing interpretation guidelines 
The process for developing interpretation guidelines is similar 
to the process that the Adjudications and Rulings Division 
employs for preparing public binding rulings. Three people 
are appointed to each project. An analyst is the principal 
researcher and author for the project. A manager helps the 
analyst and provides guidance throughout. A “sign off” has 
the responsibility to challenge the robustness of the work, its 
technical reasoning, and its logic. Sometimes a fourth person 
is appointed as adviser where there are specialised issues that 
need additional expertise. 
An initial “directions meeting” identifies issues and 
suggests promising avenues for research. The three or four 
officials hold later meetings as the project progresses. Before 
a ruling or a guideline is produced the analyst prepares a 
detailed issues report, which includes conclusions that must 
be agreed by the manager and approved by the “sign off”. 
Like public rulings, interpretation guidelines are subject to 
extensive consultation, both within and outside the 
department. Consultation includes circulation to professional 
bodies, advertising drafts for comment in Inland Revenue’s 
Tax Information Bulletin, and placing copies on the 
department’s website. Statements can remain as “exposure 
drafts” for long periods, sometimes years. 
In exercising both its adjudication and its rulings functions, 
the Adjudications and Rulings Division is careful to consult 
                                                  
3 Id s 91DB(1). 
4 Id s 91DC(1)(b). 
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formally with the Policy Advice Division of Inland Revenue 
and also with relevant segments of the Operations Division. 
However, the ultimate decision in respect of applications for 
private or product rulings rests with the Adjudications and 
Rulings Division. The Division attempts to apply an objective 
interpretational approach rather than an approach that is based 
on fiscal policy or on an endeavour to protect the revenue. 
This approach carries over into the division’s work on 
interpretation guidelines. 
1.5. Quality of interpretation guidelines, public rulings, 
and product rulings 
On the face of it, there is much to be gained from the 
Commissioner’s practice of publishing interpretation 
guidelines. Guidance to taxpayers and to officials and insights 
into the department’s thinking all appear to be good things. 
But these initial reactions are questionable, particularly where 
guidelines relate to avoidance, to form and substance, or to 
other areas where there is generalised uncertainty. The major 
problem is that where the Commissioner tries to set rules 
within areas that Parliament has left vague or covered by 
general principle he is apt inadvertently to offer taxpayers 
routes to plan around those rules. 
A full study of the quality of policy statements and 
interpretation guidelines that the Commissioner has issued 
would be a large task. This paper considers three statements 
and suggests that they suffer from a number of shortcomings. 
The three statements are an exposure draft on form and 
substance, an interpretation guideline on shams, and a policy 
statement on avoidance. 
2. Interpretation guideline exposure draft on 
form and substance in taxation law 
2.1. Introduction 
In 1998, the Inland Revenue Department published an 
exposure draft of an interpretation guideline, “Form and 
Substance in Taxation Law.”5 As the draft explains: 
Interpretation guidelines are intended to clarify general 
points of interpretation that are causing, or may cause, 
difficulty for practitioners, taxpayers, and Inland Revenue. 
An interpretation guideline is Inland Revenue’s opinion as 
to the better view of the law. That view is developed from 
an appreciation and assessment of the law on a particular 
topic, as gleaned from the cases. 
                                                  
5 New Zealand Inland Revenue Department document reference IG9703 
(1998). 
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The draft finishes with this warning: 
Draft items produced by the Adjudications and Rulings 
Business Group represent the preliminary, though 
considered, views of the Commissioner of Inland Revenue. 
In draft form these items may not be relied on by 
taxation officers, taxpayers, and (sic, or?) practitioners. 
Only finalised items represent authoritative statements by 
Inland Revenue of its stance on the particular issues 
covered. 
Although the document is an “exposure” draft that is 
qualified by the explanations set out above, it is understood 
that it describes the manner in which the department interprets 
the law. There are several deficiencies in the department’s 
approach. 
2.2. Form and substance analysis 
A cardinal shortcoming of the exposure draft is that its 
structure assumes that a bipartite division of form and 
substance is a sufficient analytical framework for the task that 
it addresses. In particular, it does not divide “substance” into 
legal substance and economic substance. It says,  “The 
[courts’] only significant departure from [a formalistic] 
approach is when the essential genuineness of a transaction is 
challenged” (by alleging that the transaction is a sham). This 
remark calls for two comments. 
First, it does not sufficiently recognise that when a court 
deploys a form/substance analysis the exercise is, as it were, a 
sub-set of the discipline of statutory construction. The 
question in every tax case is, “On its true construction, does 
the statute capture the gain or allow the expense in 
question?”. As Lord Hoffman put it in Macniven v 
Westmoreland Investments Ltd,6 
There is ultimately only one principle of construction, 
namely to ascertain what Parliament meant by using the 
language of the statute. All other “principles of 
construction” can be no more than guides which past judges 
have put forward, some more helpful or insightful than 
others, to assist in the task of interpretation. [There do not 
exist] overriding legal principle[s], superimposed on the 
whole of revenue law without regard to the language or 
purpose of any particular provision. 
By way of exception, in New Zealand and Australia 
section BG 1 of the Income Tax Act 1994 and Part IVA of the 
Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 do in fact constitute 
“overriding legal principles superimposed on the whole of 
revenue law” or, at least, on income tax law, but these 
exceptions do not gainsay the general applicability of Lord 
                                                  
6 [2001] 2 WLR 377 [29]. 
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Hoffman’s dictum. The exposure draft attempts to achieve a 
certainty that is illusory. In doing so it fails to appreciate that 
its subject matter is statutory construction, which involves 
more a series of approaches than a group of rules. 
2.3. Search for legal substance 
Secondly, when a transaction is challenged as a sham and 
not genuine, or as being in substance something different 
from what its form suggests, the courts have essentially one 
response. This response is to seek the true legal obligations 
and rights that the transaction imposes or confers on the 
parties to it. 
Courts often explain this exercise by adopting one of two 
bipartite frameworks. The first is the form/legal substance 
dichotomy. When the form of a transaction, or the label that 
the parties give to the transaction, is different from the true 
legal substance of the transaction, then the courts construe the 
transaction according to the true legal rights and obligations 
that it creates, that is, according to its true legal substance. An 
example is Ensign Tankers (Leasing) Ltd v Stokes.7 In that 
case, the House of Lords held that a transaction that was 
constructed as a non-recourse loan was in legal substance a 
partnership, and that it should be treated as a partnership for 
tax purposes. 
The second bipartite framework entails distinguishing 
between a transaction’s true legal substance and its economic 
effect. A recent example is CIR v Wattie.8 In that case, the 
Privy Council held that a payment that the Commissioner of 
Inland Revenue argued was a rent subsidy was in legal 
substance a premium paid by a landlord to attract a tenant, 
notwithstanding that in economic effect the payment was just 
the same as a rent subsidy. Being a premium, the payment 
was a non-taxable capital receipt, whereas the rent subsidy 
would have been a revenue item. 
2.4. Three elements in tripartite framework 
Two features of these alternative bipartite arrangements 
require noting. First, the concept of legal substance is 
common to each framework. Secondly, whichever framework 
is appropriate to the case at hand, the correct answer is nearly 
always the same: the court must analyse the transaction 
according to its legal substance and the true legal rights and 
obligations that it creates. If the first framework is used, the 
courts reject form in favour of true legal substance. If the 
                                                  
7 [1992] 1 AC 655 HL. 
8 [1999] 1 NZLR 529, 18 NZTC 13,991 PC. 
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second framework is used, the courts reject economic 
substance in favour of legal substance. (The significance of 
the word “nearly” in the expression “nearly always the same” 
is explained in the next section of this article.) 
The result is that a conspectus of the two types of cases, 
that is, cases like Ensign Tankers and cases like Wattie, reveal 
three relevant categories: form, legal substance, and economic 
substance. The courts reject the first and third in favour of the 
second. This principle does not mean that the first and third 
categories are never correct. Rather, and subject to what is 
said in the succeeding paragraphs, they are correct only if 
they happen to coincide with legal substance, with the parties’ 
true rights and obligations. Thus in Wattie, a legal form (a 
premium) did in fact coincide with legal substance (a 
premium) and the Privy Council rejected analysis according 
to economic substance that would have led to classifying the 
payment as a rent subsidy. In Ensign Tankers, economic 
substance (a partnership) did in fact coincide with legal 
substance (a partnership) and the House of Lords rejected 
form (a non-recourse loan). 
2.5. Limits of tripartite analysis 
The tripartite framework of legal form, legal substance, and 
economic substance is useful and will explain and rationalise 
many cases. However, it is not a complete answer. It is not a 
rule of law but a principle of construction. In some cases the 
framework does not operate. For instance, in Southern 
Railway of Peru Ltd v Owen, Lord Radcliffe said:9 
The answer to the question what can or cannot be admitted 
into the annual account is not provided by any exact 
analysis of the legal form of the relevant obligation. In this 
case, as in the Sun Insurance10 case, you get into a world of 
unreality if you try to solve your problem in that way, 
because, where you are dealing with a number of similar 
obligations that arise from trading, although it may be true 
to say of each separate one that it may never mature, it is 
the sum of the obligations that matters to the trader, and 
experience may show that, while each remains uncertain, 
the aggregate can be fixed with some precision. 
The matters in question in the Southern Railway case were 
contingent obligations to disburse severance pay pursuant to 
contracts of employment, the obligations being individually 
unquantified. In the passage quoted, Lord Radcliffe both 
expressly rejected reliance on the legal form of the 
transactions and impliedly rejected legal substance, in that the 
                                                  
9 [1957] AC 334, 357 HL. 
10 Sun Insurance Office v Clark [1912] AC 443 HL, footnote added. 
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form and substance of the unquantified obligations 
coincided.) Instead, he chose the economic substance that 
“experience may show …  can be fixed with some precision”. 
Analysis such as that of Lord Radcliffe has been relatively 
rare in tax cases except where the statute uses general terms 
like “profit”. Like Lord Radcliffe, judges may take such 
drafting as an invitation to call commercial concepts in aid to 
flesh out the meaning of words that do not have a precise 
legal meaning. 
2.6. Influence of Westmoreland Investments case 
As a result of Macniven v Westmoreland Investments Ltd, 
this kind of reasoning may become more widespread. In that 
case, Lord Hoffman employed this reasoning in his 
explanation of WT Ramsay Ltd v IRC11. His Lordship said:12 
Thus in saying that the transactions in the Ramsay case 
were not sham transactions, one is accepting the juristic 
categorisation of the transactions as individual and discrete 
and saying that each of them involved no pretence. They 
were intended to do precisely what they purported to do. 
They had a legal reality. But in saying that they did not 
constitute a “real” disposal giving rise to a “real” loss, one 
is rejecting the juristic categorisation as not being 
necessarily determinative for the purposes of the statutory 
concepts of “disposal” and “loss” as properly interpreted. 
The contrast here is with a commercial meaning of those 
concepts. And in saying that the income tax legislation was 
intended to operate “in the real world”, one is again 
referring to the commercial context which should influence 
the construction of the concepts used by Parliament. 
In this passage, Lord Hoffman rejects both “juristic 
categorisation” (which no doubt includes legal form) and 
“legal reality” (that is, legal substance) as determinative. 
Instead, he chooses a “commercial meaning”, that is, 
economic substance. Most people see Macniven v 
Westmoreland Investments Ltd as narrowing the scope of the 
Ramsay principle, which conclusion is probably correct as far 
as it goes. But the case may also widen the area within which 
courts will opt for economic over legal substance.  
2.7. Self-cancelling transactions 
The preceding paragraphs have tried to show that the 
exposure draft’s relatively simple dichotomy of form and 
substance is insufficiently nuanced and too inflexible to serve 
as a useful tool of analysis of tax cases. The draft itself 
illustrates the point in its discussion of a practical example 
                                                  
11 [1982] AC 300 HL. 
12 [2001] 2 WLR 377 [41].  
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formed by a pair of opposing transactions that balance one 
another in both legal and economic substance. The draft 
specifically denies the possibility of considering the 
transactions together as a self-cancelling matrix. The example 
is: 
P purchases some assets from M for $100,000. P and M 
then enter into a simultaneous put and call option 
agreement under which: 
- M has the right to buy the assets back for $110,000 (call 
option); 
- P has the right to sell the assets to M, also for $110,000 
(put option). 
The draft states that these options must necessarily be 
treated as separate transactions, even though they are part of a 
single agreement. It is possible that there are circumstances 
where the opinion in the draft would be correct. However, 
there are not enough secondary facts in the example to decide 
whether a court would consider each transaction separately 
and give each transaction full effect, or whether it would 
conflate the transactions into a single, self-cancelling matrix. 
Indeed, there are no secondary facts given in the example. 
Tax officials faced with cases where the primary facts 
match the balancing transactions in the example could be 
forgiven for following the analysis in the draft and assuming 
that the law will inevitably require each transaction to be 
given separate effect. 
2.8. Self-cancelling in the Magnum case 
Interestingly, some people seem to have adopted the approach 
just described in analysing the Magnum scheme in the Wine 
Box papers. People may recall that the core transactions in the 
Magnum scheme were an agreement to sell a promissory note, 
and another agreement to buy the same note. The Magnum 
scheme’s pair of transactions were, if anything, less closely 
inter-related than the put and call options in the exposure 
draft’s example. The differences are first that the Magnum 
transactions were not formally part of a single agreement and 
secondly that, while one party was the same in both Magnum 
transactions, the second parties to the two transactions were 
not identical but were sibling companies in the same group. 
On their facts, there is a tenable argument that the Magnum 
transactions were self-cancelling and did not have the effect 
that was purported by their authors, to put the matter at its 
lowest. In fact, in European Pacific Banking Corporation v 
Television New Zealand13 the Court of Appeal went further, 
and, taking into account the secondary facts of the Magnum 
                                                  
13 [1994] 3 NZLR 43. 
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scheme, held that Television New Zealand had established a 
seriously arguable case that the whole scheme was iniquitous. 
(Iniquity was relevant because the plaintiff’s claim for an 
injunction was based on an allegation that Television New 
Zealand was relying on stolen documents. One defence was 
that the transactions involved iniquity; that is, the plaintiff did 
not come to equity with clean hands.) In the later case of 
Peters v Davison14 the Court of Appeal confirmed its earlier 
opinion that the Magnum promissory note transaction could 
be ineffectual because one leg of the transaction cancelled the 
other. 
Comparing the exposure draft’s example with the Magnum 
scheme illustrates that form/substance analysis is much more 
subtle, elusive, and impressionistic than would appear to be 
the case to a reader of the draft. Although the draft purports to 
be no more than a draft, and is subject to correction, the 
ordinary course of events would not necessarily see the 
necessary corrections made. If there is reliance on the period 
of exposure of the draft to provoke professional comment that 
would identify errors, that reliance may well be misplaced. 
Nine times out of ten, the view that the draft espouses will 
suit the taxpayer rather than the Commissioner. It would be a 
most altruistic practitioner from the private sector who would 
seek to correct the draft. 
2.9. Causes for concern 
One does not want to be unfair to the department in criticising 
a document that is only an exposure draft. On the other hand, 
the draft was published on 4 June 1997, and remains an 
exposure draft at the time of writing. By the end of 1998 had 
attracted only five submissions.15 None of them made the 
points made in this article. It is unrealistic for the department 
to rely on voluntary public comment to correct this kind of 
document. 
The status and likely use of the draft are a matter for 
concern. The document is in essence a pedagogic text on how 
to approach transactions by using a form/substance analytical 
framework. But in status, and in some of its language, the 
document is a draft statement of the law as the Commissioner 
understands it. There are several problems here. They stem 
from the fact that the form or substance question, as part of 
the law of statutory interpretation, is more a tool of argument 
                                                  
14 [1999] 2 NZLR 164. 
15 I McKay, AP Molloy, J Prebble & J Waugh, Tax Compliance, Report to 
the Treasurer and Minister of Revenue by a Committee of Experts on Tax 
Compliance, Wellington 1998, 136 
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or analysis than it is a statement of law. Moreover, it is a 
deceptive tool, in that, like other principles of statutory 
interpretation, judges often state it in firm, almost dogmatic 
terms, whereas in fact it is infinitely flexible and elusive. 
The matters discussed in the last paragraph give cause for 
concern about the users of the interpretation guideline. If 
people are knowledgeable about tax law, they will understand 
that, despite its form, the statement can in only a limited sense 
function as a statement of the Commissioner’s view of the 
law. But these people will already know enough about tax law 
that they will either not need to use the statement, or, worse, 
they will be able to use it against the Commissioner, picking 
on passages that can be deployed against him. 
If people’s knowledge of tax law is such that they need the 
statement to inform them about the form/substance distinction 
there is every risk that they will be misled. In difficult cases, 
the form/substance distinction is a matter of shadings of grey. 
The draft statement does not paint a picture that is purely 
black and white, but it does give an impression of much more 
certainty and logic than in fact exist. A tax official relying on 
the statement to help in analysing and categorising a difficult 
transaction could well come to the wrong conclusion. 
Revising and correcting the statement is not the answer. 
The statement is not really an “interpretation” of a difficult or 
ambiguous rule of tax law, and hardly qualifies to be called an 
“interpretation guideline”. As mentioned earlier, it is more in 
the nature of instruction in the use of a particular analytical 
technique. Because the technique is a tool, in close cases it 
can be used to argue either side. Publishing an explanation of 
such a technique as a formal statement of the Commissioner’s 
view of the law can inadvertently give tax advisers in the 
private sector an argument that, in substance, does not exist. 
Further, it can cause officials to reach incorrect conclusions. 
As has been explained, it may be that the drafters of the 
statement themselves came to an incorrect conclusion in 
respect of self-cancelling transactions. 
A further cause for concern is that, although the draft is 
subject to revision after exposure, at publication it stated the 
Commissioner’s then (and apparently still) current 
“considered views”. Have those views affected any private 
binding rulings that have been issued in recent years? Have 
they influenced decisions about completed transactions that 
have come to the attention of inspectors? One cannot answer 
these questions, because private rulings are not published, and 
because decisions about individual taxpayers are confidential. 
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2.10. General reflections on interpretation guidelines 
In conclusion, consider the purpose of interpretation 
guidelines that set out not interpretations of law but, in effect, 
instructions or information on how to go about methods of 
legal reasoning. To the extent that users are Inland Revenue 
Department staff, the purpose is commendable and necessary: 
it is most important for staff to be educated in methods of 
legal reasoning. But are interpretation guidelines appropriate 
vehicles for such education? If interpretation guidelines are to 
fulfil the function that their name implies, they must be 
reasonably concise and dogmatic. Legal reasoning has many 
qualities, but concise dogmatism is not one of them. Where it 
is a question of education or instruction of officials on 
methods of legal reasoning, the conventional vehicles of 
textbooks, articles, and class instruction are more appropriate. 
There is no obvious need for a particular approach to be 
sanctioned by the Commissioner. Indeed, the expense of 
settling an agreed, concise, statement must be considerable, 
compared with the greater latitude that is appropriate in an 
educational context. 
There must also be concern about directing interpretation 
guidelines of the kind under discussion to taxpayers and 
practitioners. Non-specialists who do not know how this kind 
of statement fits into the total context of the law would be ill 
advised to rely on them. Specialists do not need them and are 
apt to turn them against the Commissioner. 
3. Interpretation guideline on shams 
3.1. Bipartite analysis 
The second statement to be considered is an interpretation 
guideline entitled “Sham” – meaning of the term, which was 
published in 1997.16 The guideline is an item of three or four 
pages, much along the lines of a short expository article that 
one might find in a professional or scholarly journal or as part 
of a chapter in a textbook. 
The guideline mentions relevant law, draws certain 
conclusions, and gives some examples. It suffers from the 
shortcoming that its analysis of shams takes place within an 
analytical framework that is not wholly adequate. It adopts the 
same bipartite approach as the exposure draft on form and 
substance that has just been discussed. Loosely, courts talk in 
terms of contrasting the form of a transaction with its 
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11, p 7. 
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substance. The guideline adopts this dichotomy, but a two-
part framework is not sufficiently refined to elucidate the 
cases. As explained, in this context the courts use a 
framework that has at least three levels: economic substance, 
legal substance, and legal form. Generally speaking, courts 
adopt the second level, legal substance, as correctly 
representing the effect of transactions for the purpose of tax 
cases. 
3.2. No halfway house 
A second difficulty is that the guideline keeps to the 
assumption that there is no halfway house between a sham 
and an effective transaction. There are plenty of dicta in the 
cases that appear to support this principle, and it is accurate as 
far as it goes. But the principle must be understood within a 
wider context. That context is that, above and beyond the 
doctrine of sham, the courts do in fact decline to accord to 
certain categories of genuine, non-sham, transactions the 
effect that those transactions purport to have. In strict logic, 
these impugnable transactions are sub-categories of genuine 
transactions, but for practical purposes they may well be 
thought of as forming a kind of halfway house between sham 
transactions and genuine transactions. 
The main inhabitants of this quasi-halfway house are 
mislabelled transactions, self-cancelling transactions, and 
transactions that, when interpreted in context, have an effect 
different from the initial impression that the reader gains from 
one or more of the documents.17 (The interpretation guideline 
mentions the third category by implication in its discussion of 
Richardson J’s judgment in Re Securitibank (No 2)18, but it 
does not explore the implications of the category in a manner 
that is sufficiently informative.) 
The difficulty with the Department’s interpretation 
guideline is that most readers would take it to be 
comprehensive in scope, (in the sense of covering or referring 
to the whole relevant field, rather than in the sense of being a 
fully detailed analysis). The guideline reinforces this 
impression by quoting the “no halfway house” principle, 
which has misled a good many readers of judgments in the 
past. The problem is compounded by the fact that the 
guideline appears to be a general, authoritative statement. In 
contrast, reported judgments can be misleading enough, but at 
                                                  
17 See J. Prebble “Criminal Law, Tax Evasion, Shams, and Tax 
Avoidance: Part II – Criminal Law Consequences of Categories of 
Evasion and Avoidance” (1996) 2 New Zealand Journal of Taxation Law 
and Policy, 59, 63 - 66. 
18 [1978] 2 NZLR 136. 
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least most readers of law reports appreciate that statements of 
principle in judgments can be taken as generally authoritative 
only within limits. 
4. Policy statement on section 99 of the Income 
Tax Act 1976 
4.1. Introduction 
The Commissioner’s policy statement on the application of 
section 99 of the Income Tax Act 1976, the general anti-
avoidance section, was published in 1990.19 The statement 
seems to have governed much of the department’s approach 
tax avoidance since it was published. 
Section 99, now section BG 1, was last amended as to 
substance in 1974, though there have been several changes of 
detail as the section has been moved from one Act to another. 
The 1974 wording was carried forward into the 1976 Act as 
section 99. The section was disaggregated into several 
components in the 1994 Act. It is now found in section BG 1, 
section GB 1, and in several definition provisions in section 
OB 1. Nevertheless, the essential terminology remains as it 
was in 1974 and the 1990 policy statement continues to apply 
to it. 
It is understood that the Commissioner intends to withdraw 
the statement in due course, but not until a substitute has been 
completed. 
4.2. Objective/subjective test 
A number of passages in the policy statement give cause for 
concern. For instance, there are passages that have the effect 
of imposing burdens on officials who try to deploy section 
BG 1 where those burdens are not inherent in the text of the 
section itself. Correctly, the statement recognises that the 
section BG 1 test is objective: does the impugned 
arrangement avoid tax?; not, did the parties try to avoid tax? 
However, some of the text of the statement is framed in terms 
that could be interpreted as employing a subjective test. An 
example is, 
The evaluation will be with a view to concluding whether 
one can predicate whether the arrangement was 
implemented in its particular way so as to achieve an 
income tax advantage.20 
This passage is apt to take inspectors’ attention away from 
arrangements themselves, and to encourage them to seek a tax 
avoidance purpose entertained by the people responsible for 
                                                  
19 Taxpayer Information Bulletin no 8, February 1990, appendix C. 
20Id 3. 
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implementation. The section does not require the 
Commissioner to establish such a purpose. 
4.3. Four-step test 
Secondly, the statement sets out a four-step analytical 
framework that is said to be required of “the Commissioner’s 
approach” to section BG 1 cases. This approach is said to 
require a careful and thorough analysis of:21 
(a) the underlying scheme and purpose of the Act as a 
whole and of the specific provisions under review; 
(b) the arrangement to ascertain its purpose or effect; 
(c) whether a fair and reasonable inference can be drawn 
that tax avoidance is one purpose of the arrangement (other 
than merely incidental); 
(d) whether following this analysis it can be inferred that 
the arrangement frustrates the underlying scheme and 
purpose of the legislation. 
One problem with the phraseology of the four steps is that 
it seems to accept that the Commissioner has the burden of 
proof, which is not so. A second problem is that step (d) asks 
whether an arrangement that may already have been 
determined to involve more than merely incidental tax 
avoidance at step (c) “frustrates the underlying scheme and 
purpose of the legislation”. The underlying scheme and 
purpose of the legislation is not mentioned in section BG 1. 
That is not to say that underlying scheme and purpose are 
irrelevant to a section BG 1 inquiry, but tax inspectors accept 
too heavy a burden if they are required to elevate underlying 
scheme and purpose to an independent test. 
There is a further problem with the four-step test. 
Taxpayers began to use it to raise procedural objections to the 
Commissioner’s assessments. Had the Commissioner 
conscientiously worked through each of the self-imposed 
steps? Did the reasoning in respect of each step withstand 
scrutiny? For a few years, it began to look as though the four 
steps would become four trip-wires that would give substance 
to judicial review applications in almost any section BG 1 
case. Perhaps fortunately for the Commissioner and for the 
general body of taxpayers, this argument reached the Privy 
Council in the case of Miller v CIR,22 a tax shelter appeal that 
drew a notably long bow. In that case, the policy statement 
was called the “CPS”. The taxpayers argued that it was ultra 
vires for an inspector to come to a conclusion in an avoidance 
                                                  
21 Id 2. 
22 [2001] 3 NZLR 316 PC. 
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case without going through the four steps of the CPS. Lord 
Hoffman retorted:23 
…  the question of whether an arrangement is void against 
the Commissioner under s 99(2) is not a matter for his 
discretion or policy. The Act says that an arrangement 
falling within the terms of the section “shall be absolutely 
void”. Likewise, the Commissioner is under a statutory duty 
to reassess the taxpayer’s income to counteract any tax 
advantage. Discretion enters into the matter only as to the 
method of calculation by which the Commissioner 
discharges that duty. 
The CPS nevertheless reassured taxpayers that, before 
invoking s 99, the Commissioner would undertake a careful 
and thorough analysis of the meaning and purpose of the 
statute and the purpose or effect of the arrangement. He 
would consider whether it was a fair and reasonable 
inference that one purpose was tax avoidance. He would 
decide whether the scheme frustrated the underlying 
scheme and purpose of the legislation. 
… . 
…  their Lordships do not think that the CPS was intended 
to lay down conditions at all. …  the parts of the document 
relied upon by the appellants do [no] more than to reassure 
the public that the Commissioner and his officers will think 
very carefully about whether s 99 applies to any particular 
case. But his statutory duty is to reassess the taxpayer in 
any case in which s 99 applies and this duty cannot be made 
subject to internal conditions. 
Thus, at least the policy statement does not constitute a 
procedural handicap for the Commissioner when it comes to 
litigation. 
4.4. Examples of arrangements 
The policy statement contains an annex that gives several 
examples of arrangements that might amount to avoidance. It 
blesses some of them and condemns others. As an example of 
the former, take, for instance, number 4, an arbitrage scheme 
that contrives to grant a tax preference to foreigners when 
acquiring shares in petroleum mining companies. The policy 
statement accepts that this scheme escapes section BG 1 even 
though section 160A of the 1976 Act in terms awarded the 
preference to New Zealand residents only. (Alternatively, 
depending on the price at which New Zealand residents sell 
their shares to foreigners, the scheme involves not arbitrage 
but New Zealand residents obtaining a preference for 
investing in petroleum mining shares that they own for only 
two weeks.) 
On the basis of a formalistic analysis, the policy statement 
determines that the scheme in example 4 is not vulnerable to 
                                                  
23 Id 330. 
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attack under section BG 1. This conclusion is doubtful.  At 
any rate, if the example is correct it follows that section 160A 
did not achieve its intended effect. If so, the section should 
have been amended. If section 160A was deficient in the 
manner that the Commissioner explains in the statement then, 
of course, the Commissioner had no option but to assess 
people on the basis of section 160A’s correct meaning, 
deficient though it was. But what are the merits of publishing 
a statement that highlights this assumed deficiency and that 
invites taxpayers to exploit it? In any event, it is curious that 
the Commissioner should have given way on such a scheme 
without testing the position in court. 
5. Conclusion 
5.1. Anti-avoidance rules 
Since it was published, the 1990 policy statement seems to 
have had considerable influence. It may be part of the 
explanation for the infrequency with which the Commissioner 
has invoked section BG 1 from the time of its re-drafting in 
1974. 
From the point of view of sound tax administration it is 
questionable whether Commissioners should issue policy 
statements or interpretation guidelines about general anti-
avoidance rules, although there is always a good deal of 
pressure for them to do so. Throughout the history of the New 
Zealand and Australian general anti-avoidance rules, 
taxpayers, and sometimes the courts, have asked Parliament 
for more details. What sorts of transactions are caught? What 
are acceptable? In New Zealand, Parliament has resisted this 
pressure. 
In 1985, in Challenge Corporation v CIR,24 Woodhouse P 
explained: 
[T]here can be no doubt that when the provision was 
amplified and given its present statutory form by Parliament 
in 1974 the deliberate decision was then taken that, because 
the problem of definition in this elusive field could not be 
met by expressly spelling out a series of detailed 
specifications in the statute itself, the interstices must be left 
for attention by the Judges. … . [I]nherent in the approach 
taken by Parliament is an assurance that some expressed 
judicial misgivings as to the proper role of the Court 
concerning the earlier legislation have been misplaced. 
…  In New Zealand the Courts must now ensure that the 
anti-avoidance provision as it stands is given that purposive 
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construction which will enable it to do its work in the 
balanced but effective way intended for it. 
It is a curious irony that the Commissioner’s policy 
statement fills a lacuna that Parliament intentionally left 
empty. The more detailed rules there are within the overall 
ambit of a general anti-avoidance rule, the greater the risk of 
people circumventing them. Formally, the Commissioner’s 
statement does not constitute binding rules, but in practice the 
department is reluctant to deploy section BG 1 against 
taxpayers who have brought themselves within an example 
that is said to escape the section. 
There is a parallel, though possibly not a close one, 
between the Commissioner’s policy statement and the 
considerable detail that Australia added to Part IVA of the 
Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 when the Commonwealth 
Parliament replaced the former section 260 of that Act. The 
reason for having a general anti-avoidance rule is that income 
is an imperfect tax base. Parliament cannot foresee all the 
possible stratagems that taxpayers may employ to minimise 
their tax. The response is a general rule. The less general the 
rule becomes, the less effective it is. This consideration may 
explain some of the Australian Commissioner’s failures.25 
5.2. Interpretation statements in general 
In the nineteenth century it was said that in the Court of 
Chancery no case was certain but none hopeless. While an 
exaggeration, there remains some truth in this statement when 
applied to tax cases today. This is particularly so in respect of 
cases that depend on the application of a somewhat flexible 
form of reasoning rather than on relatively black letter law. 
Examples of such flexible forms of reasoning include: 
applying the principles of statutory interpretation; drawing the 
line between capital and revenue items; applying the statutory 
anti-avoidance rule; and analysing facts according to the 
form/substance distinction (in effect a sub-set of statutory 
interpretation). 
It is very difficult for anyone who is trying to manage a 
department of state according to the law to allow for the level 
of flexibility, and even of inconsistency, that is inherent in the 
jurisprudence tax cases (not of individual cases, but of tax 
cases taken as a body). For efficiency, it seems to make sense 
to try to produce reasonably formal, certain rules to govern 
officials’ decision-making. However, one result, seen in the 
Interpretation Guideline on Shams, the Exposure Draft of the 
                                                  
25 E.g., Eastern Nitrogen Ltd v FCT (2000) 46 ATR 474 Fed Ct, Full Ct; 
FCT v Metal Manufacturers Ltd [2001] FCA 365, 46 ATR 497, Fed Ct, 
Full Ct. 
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Interpretation Guideline on Form and Substance in Taxation 
Law, and the Policy Statement on Section 99, is that blunt 
instruments are used to try to achieve refined objectives. 
It is easier to identify the problem than it is to suggest 
practical solutions. The Commissioner can only work within 
the budget that he has and with the staff that are available. As 
a minimum, however, it is suggested that the Commissioner 
should consider issuing interpretation guidelines very 
sparingly, if at all, in areas where the law depends primarily 
on an approach or method of reasoning, and where relevant 
facts vary infinitely from case to case. 
 
